



The Process and Proof for Formal Sign-Off – A Live Case Study

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- Introduction Formal Sign-off
- A Live Case Study "Break the Testbench" challenge at DAC 2015





Introduction – Formal Sign-off





What is End-to-End Formal?

- Local Assertions: Easier to verify
 - Internal RTL assertions, embedded in RTL
- Interface Assertions: Harder to verify
 - Relate to inputs/outputs

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- E.g. ACE, AXI4, OCP, DDR2, ...
- End-to-End Checkers: Hardest to verify
 - Model end-to-end functionality
 - Often require Abstraction Models to manage complexity
 - Can replace simulation



Designs Best Suited for DESIGN AND VERIFICATION DESIGN AND VERIFICATI

"Control", "Data Transport" <u>designer</u> size blocks:

- Arbiters of many kinds
- Interrupt controller
- Power management unit
- Credit manager block
- Tag generator
- Scheduler

- Bus bridge
- Memory controller
- DMA controller
- Host bus interface
- Standard interface (PCIe, USB)
- Clock disable unit



Many Soc Blocks Can Be Verified With End-to-End Formal



- Planning at the micro-architectural design stage is critical
- End-to-End formal can fully replace simulation for many blocks



Quality of Formal Depends on all 4 Cs!





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For End-to-End formal to be complete, ideal metrics answer:

- Constraints: Have I unintentionally over-constrained any inputs?
- Complexity: Have all my checkers reached the Required Proof Depth?
- Checkers: Does my list of checkers fully embody the specified behaviour of the design?

We will use Formal Coverage to quantify each of these three questions

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- Review the list of constraints with the designer
- Validate absence of unintentional over-constraints:
 - 1. Instantiate of constraints as assertions in simulation
 - 2. Use cross-proof with neighboring blocks
 - 3. Use of formal coverage



- Use the 6-step methodology to derive the RPD*
- Use formal coverage to quantify RPD
- All End-to-End checkers need to reach the RPD

*Kim, N., et al. "Sign-off with Bounded Formal Verification Proofs," in DVCon 2014

Complexity: Using Creative Conference and exhibition UNITED STATES

Resolving complexity challenges using Abstraction Models, or other techniques

- Sequence, counter, reset, floating pulse ...



CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION OF End-to-End Checkers

- Review the list of checkers with the designer
 - Ensure each output has an End-to-End checker, unless the designer determines the output does not need one
 - For example no need to verify profiling signals or test signals that are not related to design functionality
- Use negative testing (design mutation)
 - Randomly/Intelligently insert design bugs manually to make sure they are caught by existing checkers
 - Verify that every bug found by simulation is also found by existing checkers
- Use formal coverage (proof core) to ensure 100% code coverage



Live Case Study – "Break the Testbench" Challenge at DAC 2015



DESIGN AND VERIFICATION MUlticast Crossbar Design Specifications UNITED STATES

- A client can send request along with data to any target
- A client request can go to multiple targets (multicast)
- Each target has an arbiter that determines which client's request gets forwarded







Files	6
Lines of RTL code	1,229
Flops	312
Outputs	32
Inputs	τu



English List of End-to-End Checkers

- Arbitration checker on req_out and client_id
 - 1. Among multiple requests, a request with highest priority type (strict, high, normal) should be seen at output
 - 2. Among multiple requests of the same priority, a given client should not get a grant twice before the other client has been given a grant
- Consistency checker on req_out and client_id
 - Any output from a target should have had an associated client request (i.e. no spurious outputs are seen)
- Consistency checker on grant
 - Any grant at a client should have had an associated client request (i.e. no spurious grants are seen)
- Consistency checker on req_data_out
 - Data seen at target output should be consistent with data seen at client input (i.e. data should not be corrupted, duplicated, reordered or dropped)
- Forward progress checker on req_out
 - A client request should be seen at some target output within finite time
- Forward progress checker on grant
 - A client request should get a grant within finite time



- If strict or high priority is asserted by a client, request must be asserted by the client
- Once request is asserted by a client; request, strict priority, high priority and data must be held stable until grant is asserted
- Only one client will send a strict priority request at a time



- 8 clients and 8 targets, each client can send a request to multiple targets
 - Large number of combinations need to be tracked to fully verify the design
- Select symbolic random client and symbolic random target
 - Track all requests from symbolic client to symbolic target
 - All possible combinations exercised by formal tool in single run

Design and VERIFICATION DESIGN AND VERIFICATI



How FIFO based scheme works?



Design and VERIFICATION DATA CONSIStency Checking Using Wolper Coloring Technique



How Wolper coloring technique (0^*110^{ω}) works?



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- Reviewed list of constraints with the designer
- Validated using formal coverage (no over-constraints)
 - Line Coverage
 - Total lines: 288
 - Covered lines: 288 (100%)
 - Condition Coverage
 - Total lines: 88
 - Covered lines: 88 (100%)



CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION OF End-to-End Checkers

- List of checkers reviewed with the designer
- 73 artificial functional bugs were manually inserted in the DAC 2015 Challenge
 - Checkers found all of them!

CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION UNITED STATES Example Bugs Inserted During the Challenge

Bug Category	Original RTL	Buggy RTL	#Failing checkers
Arbitration Scheme	<pre>// arbiter.sv 60 assign high_prio_req = (str_prio_req) ? {NUM_CLIENT{1'b0}} : (high_prio & req);</pre>	<pre>// arbiter.sv 60 assign high_prio_req = ((str_prio_req high_prio_req)) ? {NUM_CLIENT{1'b0}} : req;</pre>	4
Arbitration Scheme	<pre>// rr_scheme.sv 56 assign shft_req = {req, req};</pre>	<pre>// rr_scheme.sv 56 assign shft_req = {8'd0, req};</pre>	2
Arbitration Scheme	<pre>// rr_scheme.sv 65 for(i = 0; i < (2 * NUM_CLIENT); i = i + 1) begin</pre>	<pre>// rr_scheme.sv 66 for(i = 0; i < (2 * NUM_CLIENT - 1); i = i + 1) begin</pre>	2
Connectivity	// xbar_8x8.sv 274 .high_prio(high_prio_4),	<pre>// xbar_8x8.sv 274 .high_prio(high_prio_3),</pre>	4
Grant generation	// one_dly.sv 71 assign gnt_i = has_data ? outgoing_data : 1'b1;	<pre>// one_dly.sv 71 assign gnt_i = has_data ? outgoing_data : 1'b0;</pre>	2
Wrong operator	<pre>// target.sv 89 assign t2c_grant = {NUM_CLIENT{ext_grant_pp}} & arb_gnt_pp;</pre>	<pre>// target.sv 89 assign t2c_grant = {NUM_CLIENT{ext_grant_pp}} && arb_gnt_pp;</pre>	8

Non-bug #1: Round Robin Arbiter Initial Value Change



i=1 makes an RTL optimization to use an n-iteration loop instead of an n+1-iteration loop

- Makes the design slightly better, area-wise
- No functional impact

Non-bug #2: Grant is 0 After Counter CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION INITED STATES

- Bug was inserted with a "malicious intent"
 - Used knowledge of the verification methodology to specifically change the design, such that the defect cannot be caught by the test-bench
 - Defeats the purpose of "true" verification i.e. find all "naturally occurring" bugs
- Increased the Required Proof Depth, making bug impossible for formal (and sometimes simulation) to find, without using Abstraction Models



- Significant design blocks in SoC, processor and networking chips can be verified with formal
- Formal sign-off offers ultimate confidence in verification - No bug left behind
- Formal sign-off can be achieved by ensuring
 - 1. No unintentional over-constraints
 - 2. List of checkers is complete
 - 3. All checkers reach Required Proof Depth