Safety and Security Aware Pre-Silicon Hardware / Software Co-Development

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Agenda

- Challenges
- -Safety and Security
- Shift Left
- -Benefits
- -Questions





Verification Challenge: System & Chip + Software



VERIFICATION & SOFTWARE

2^N





Automotive Design Chain & Software Challenges







Software Rework has Major Impact on System Cost



oved for Public Release. Distribution is unlimited.

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... and so does Hardware Rework!

... and requires a "Shift Left"

Relative cost of a bug



Bugs found late are costly

- Hard to debug
- Limited options to fix
- Increasing mask costs





SAFETY AND SECURITY





Significance of Security in Safety

FOOD, TRAVEL AND TECH

These Chinese hackers tricked Tesla's Autopilot into suddenly switching lanes

Published Wed, Apr 3 2019 • 11:17 AM EDT • Updated Wed, Apr 3 2019 • 12:22 PM EDT

LILY HAY NEWMAN SECURITY 08.09.2018 12:30 PM

A New Pacemaker Hack Puts Malware Directly on the Device Researchers at the Black Hat security conference will demonstrate a new pacemaker-hacking technique that can add or withhold shocks at will.



SECURITY 07.21.15 06:00 AM

Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It

Security

Newb admits he ran Satori botnet that turned thousands of hacked devices into a 100Gbps+ DDoS-for-hire cannon

One moron down, two to go



https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/



The Pattern in the Case Studies

- Mechanical functions are replaced by software
 - Lane assist & distance control
 - AD functions
- Traditionally closed systems are becoming connected
 - A pacemaker can communicate with the world
 - A car's steering and throttle can be influenced via sensors
 - The Internet of Things is all about connectivity
- Safety and security become more entangled
 - A safe system must also be secure





Safety vs. Security

Safety

- The system behaves according to the requirements in all cases
- Protects humans from machines
- A safe system must be secure
- Techniques to achieve safety
 - Requirements traceability
 - Code coverage
 - Comprehensive testing
 - Redundancy

Security

- The system behaves according to the requirements in all cases and does nothing else
- Protects machines from humans
- Security does not imply safety
- Techniques to achieve security
 - Security policy
 - Penetration testing
 - Covert channel analysis
 - Practically all safety techniques





How Does a System Look Like?



- Abstraction and functionality moves from the bottom to the top
- Dependencies move from the top to the bottom
- You can make a "safe system" with "unsafe hardware"
- Can you make a secure system without secure hardware?
 - Who would you trust?





Building a Chain of Trust



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SYSTEMS INITIATIVE

Building Safe and Secure Software

- Separation is key for both
- Separation in the time domain
 - Paramount for safety real time behavior
 - Required for security prevent DoS
- Separation in the memory domain
 - Significant enabler for complex systems
 - Significant cost redactor
- Maintaining flexibility in the system could become difficult
 - The right choice of technology is important





Separation Architecture + Virtualization







Planning for Safety and Security in Software

- Partitioning system resources
 - Separation allows greater flexibility
- Certifying mixed criticality components
 - SEooC can be leveraged to reduce total cost
 - Safety decomposition
 - Separation is essential
- Security policy enforcement
 - Separation allows you to be cost efficient
 - Can also help for a clean and simple design





The Right Tools for the Right Job

- Safety standards mandate tool qualifications
 - Could be replaced by testing in some scenarios
- Safety standards mandate tools for the whole lifecycle
 - Requirements definition and traceability
 - Code coverage
 - Reports
- Security is more challenging
 - Penetration testing requires sophisticated frameworks
 - Different code analysis tools are available
 - Run-Time agents & utilities for additional security





Hardware Considerations for Safety and Security



Functional Safety Analysis links to the traditional design/verification and implementation flow:

- To include safety mechanisms and meet the HW metrics/ASIL
 - Safety metrics, PPA, verification time, automation are all to be considered





Benefiting From Cooperation

- Hardware can greatly reduce the cost of safety
 - Reduce the overall resource demand
 - Replace software safety mechanisms
 - Provide a secure trusted platform
- Use safe hardware as early as possible!





SHIFT LEFT IN VERIFICATION







Shift Left in the V Diagram – Automotive Example







Embedded Software Challenges ...

... addressed by Virtual and Hybrid Platforms!



Embedded Software Challenges

- Register interface out of synch with drivers
- Missing Registers or, incorrect register definitions
- Incorrect routing logic or, incorrect memory map
- Software Memory Accesses to unmapped memory
- Missing Interrupt events
- Verification of SW drivers in the context of an OS boot
- Embedded SW Programming Errors and bottlenecks
- First time OS Bring up



Integration HW and SW Early



What Do Users Care About?







Wouldn't It Be Nice If "One Tool Would Rule Them All"? ... like that German Fable?

- Eierlegende Wollmilchsau
- "egg-laying wool-milk-sow"
- Perfect farm animal uniting several qualities:
 - chickens (laying eggs)
 - sheep (producing wool)
 - cows (giving out milk) and
 - pigs (can be turned into bacon)
- Produces all the daily necessities and is tasty to boot, it is an animal that only has good sides to it ...



Source: Wikimedia Commons: http://bit.ly/2fFtsK1



System Verification Characteristics







Bare Metal Compute Options

Performance



Debug Flexibility & Compile Time





Hardware/Software Co-Verification during SoC Design



Virtual Platforms to the Rescue



- Instruction Accurate software model of hardware system, at the transaction-level
- Full programmers view of design
- Runs unmodified target code
- Runs very fast (sometimes faster than real-time)
- Available 6-12 months before silicon or boards, depending on model availability
- Enables **early integration** of hardware and software, improves quality
- Could provide insight into performance
 bottlenecks, architectural analysis
- Includes SW stack
- Easy to distribute to many users

Speed, Controllability, Observability, Repeatability 019



Time to Mode

Hardware/Software Integration





Image sources: Cadence, Arm, Green Hills



Virtual Platform Debug

SystemC/TLM Aware Debug



Logviewer

VSP Log Viewer - SimVision _ 🗆 🗙						
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TLM	2016118 ns	07:21:57	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001014 DATA=0x30000000, 4 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
TLM	2016118 ns	07:21:57	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001018 DATA=0x0000, 2 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [l	
TLM	2016118 ns	07:21:57	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec00101c DATA=0x30000500, 4 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
TLM	2016118 ns	07:21:57	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001020 DATA=0x0050, 2 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
TLM	2016118 ns	07:21:57	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001004 DATA=0x00000050, 4 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
TLM	2016118 ns	07:21:57	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001008 DATA=0x0050, 2 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
TLM	2016118 ns	07:22:03	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001000 DATA=0x00000001, 4 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
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PRO	2016133 ns	07:22:03		Process activated	example_subsystem.dma.dma_process	
TLM	3000005 ns	07:22:03	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	READ from ADDR=0xec001010 DATA=0x00000000, 4 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	
TLM	3000005 ns	07:22:03	example_subsystem.dma.tsocket	WRITE to ADDR=0xec001000 DATA=0x00000003, 4 bytes in 0 s (blocking)	example_subsystem.core.core.pvbus_m [L	





Green Hills – Cadence Integration Points for Verification





CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION JRO



Virtualization with Emulation Enables SW Shifte Wirked Models - VSP

Using virtual platforms and hybrids to accelerate SW development and HW/SW validation









Key Trend: Unified Flow for Emulation and Prototyping



SYSTEMS INITIATIVE

Cadence & Green Hills Software

Safe & Secure Aerospace & Defense System Design



Safety/Security Certified RTOS







BENEFITS





More Robust Hardware and Software!



More Robust Hardware and Software! Greatly accelerated Time-to-Market! Virtual **System Emulation Chamber** Platform (Hundreds **Applications** of users) (Basic to Complex) Test 1000s of SW Middleware SoC User **Scenarios** (Graphics, Audio) (Company B) Before Tape Out! OS and Drivers **FPGA** (Linux, Android) rototyping (Dozens **Bare-metal SW** of users) **Architecture** SoC **Exploration** Sho Application Develop Mtegration & & Compute Sub-Systen Board Bo Software (Company Performance Spec System-On-Chip Bringu Certification Brir SOP **Definition Development** Development lunina **Phase** Ti **Green Hills**[®] Software Development SoC Development Fab **Post Si** DESIGN AND VERIFICATION



More Robust Hardware and Software!



CONFERENCE AND EXHIBIT

SYSTEMS INITIATIVE

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Questions

Finalize slide set with questions slide



