

# Formal Architectural Specification and Verification of A Complex SOC

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
# Outline

- The Problem Definition.
- Architecture.
- Formal Specification.
- Formal Verification.
- Results.

# The Problem Definition

- Ever increasing complexity of SOCs.
- Moving to higher levels of abstraction helps.
- At higher levels of abstraction,
  - We may think in terms of subsystems.
  - Each subsystem have its own protocols.
    - These protocols need to be validated.
  - The subsystems interact with each other.
    - Protocol interaction verification.
  - The subsystem are implemented using micro-architecture.
    - Micro-architecture verification.

# The Architecture



# Formal Specification


# Extended Table-based Specification

Current State			Next State			Outputs	Inputs
Cmd	H	N1	Cmd	H	N1	N1	Req/Resp/Frwd
none	E	I	none	S	S	Read_Response	RD_R (Read from remote node)
none	S	S	Local_Write	S	S->I	INV (Invalidate)	LCL_WR_LCL_A (local write to home address)
Local_Write	S	S->I	none	M	I	-	INV_RSP (Invalidate response)

# Agents, States, Roles and Messages

- A hardware architecture is defined with reference to an instruction set.
- An instruction's definition may involve multiple subsystems' execution.
- This execution is captured as protocol tables for each of the subsystems.
  - We may think of these subsystems as **agents**.
  - Agents can have different **states** and play different **roles** depending on the state.
  - Agents may need to send **messages** to each other.
  - We need to identify these messages:
  - Response to a message depends upon the current state of the agent.

# Architectural Agents and Roles






# Input Columns of An Agent Table

Current State			New Request Cmd			New Ack Cmd		New Data Cmd	
Transient State	Home	Remote	Requester	Server	Cmd	Requester	Cmd	Requester	Cmd
NONE	I	I	Local	Local	Read	none	none	none	none
WI00	I	K	Remote	Local	Forward	none	none	none	none
CSFH	S->I	K->E	none	none	none	Remote	PRE	none	none
ED00	I	D->E	none	none	none	none	none	Remote	PRD

# Micro-architecture

- A Micro-architecture represents **a** possible implementation of an architecture.
- Each architectural instruction is executed through a set of micro-operations.
- These micro-operations are executed inside the time-frame of one architectural steps and hence are **combinational** in nature.
- The micro-operations' execution has certain ordering requirements.
- We extended our architectural tables with micro-architectural steps.

# A Generic Architecture



# Micro-Architecture Steps

<b>R0..R7</b>	<b>Mem Reads</b>	<b>Mem Writes</b>	<b>Comment</b>
000xx	0x000	W00S0	R0..R7->T, T->Bus, Bus-> (MDR,MAR) MDR->Memory
I00xx	0x000	0V000	IR -> Bus, Bus->MAR, MAR->Memory,...
0W0xV	0x000	0V0S0	R0..R7->ALU,...,(MAR,MDR)->Memory)
0W0xF	RF000	00000	Memory->MDR, MDR->Bus, Bus->R0..R7

# Modeling micro-operations

- Using multiple micro-transitions inside one architectural transition.
  - Identify all the possible micro-operations.
  - Create a table mapping architectural action bits to the micro-operations list.
  - For each architectural role:
    - Identify the minimal list of micro-operations possible at the first micro-step.
    - Create a table linking the drivers and receivers of micro-operations.
    - Repeat the same process for the second and third micro-steps if needed.
- Create tables for each of the possible micro-steps for each of the architectural roles.

# Micro-Transitions

Micro-Operation	MEMORY	R0..R7	MAR	MDR	Bus
T->Bus					T
Bus-> (MDR,MAR)	(MAR,MDR)				
Memory->MDR			Address	Memory	
Bus->R0..R7		Bus			
IR->Bus					IR

# Macro-Operations

- Multiple Protocol interaction.
- Concurrent versus interleaved modeling.
- One protocol may have to idle/wait while other is in the middle of processing. Semaphore is one solution.
- Example:
  - An incoming forwarding message.
  - Need to compare with all the outstanding requests.
    - Multiple requests can share the same datum.
  - May takes multiple cycles for an interleaved model.
  - The IOB will not honor any other messages during this.

# Modeling Out-of-Order Interconnection

- An artificial architectural step is defined to mimic this transition.
- A FIFO of limited size modeling the interconnection.
- When buffer is not full, sender can put a message in it.
- When buffer is not empty, receiver can get a message from a random valid entry in the buffer.
  - Randomness is achieved through usage a free variable as selector.



# Constraining Inputs

- Need to create a legal environment.
- Instruction set is the main input.
- Each instruction consists of 20+ subfields and 100+ bits.
- Creating constraints for all these cases is a:
  - Huge challenge.
  - Error prone.
  - Hard to manage to accommodate consistent changes.
- Solution is the automation:
  - Generate from the protocol tables
  - DV also picked our solution for the random stimuli generation.

# Stimuli Generation


<b>Instruction</b>	<b>Requester</b>	<b>Server</b>	<b>CMD</b>	<b>Exclusive</b>	<b>Partial</b>
12'b0000000000000	Local	Local	Read	1'b0	1'b1
12'b0000000000001	Local	Local	Read	1'b0	1'b0
12'b0000000000010	Remote	Local	Write	1'b1	1'b1
12'b0000000000011	Remote	Local	Write	1'b0	1'b0

# Unique Transition Identifiers

- Each transition have been assigned a unique identifier.
- Any protocol failure trace only need to print these identifiers.
- A Tcl script can match these identifiers with the protocol tables to generate failing interaction in terms of the table transitions.
- Great help in debugging at architectural level.
- Also very useful to transaction coverage.

# Formal Verification

# Formal Verification Flow



# Assumptions

- Around 10 assumptions because of automatic stimuli generation.
- Here is a selected list.
  - Assuming address space is of size 2.
  - Assuming agents' FIFO depth is 4.
  - Assuming if an address is faulty, it can or cannot become fault-free.
  - Assuming the depth of different channels.
  - Assuming only a subset of instructions is available by constraining the “instruction” counter.

# Path Clearing

- Verifying that model is:
  - neither over-constrained
  - nor under-constrained.
- No conflicting assumptions.
- All transitions are reachable.
- All legal states are reachable.
- The legal transitions of the abstract state machine representing roles of different agents are reachable.

# Functional Correctness

- When there are no outstanding transactions the system only can be in one of the legal states.
- The completeness of each architectural role.
- Roles' abstract state machine verification.
- Cache coherence is maintained.
- Agents' messages' constraints are observed.
- There are no deadlocks because of the interaction of the architectural components.
- A dirty block in cache will always be written back to the memory before its invalidation.



# A Sample Property

**Start\_event captures the moment when agent receives a write request.**

```
property agents_constraints(start_event, start_data, end_event, end_data, Outstanding, clk, rst);  
    logic [$bits(start_data)-1:0] local_data;  
    logic [$bits(Outstanding)-1:0] numAhead;  
    (start_event, local_data = start_data, numAhead = Outstanding)  
        ##1 (numAhead > 0 ##0 end_event[->1], numAhead--)[*]  
            ##1 (numAhead == 0 ## 0 end_event[->1]) |-> end_data == local_data;  
endproperty
```

**End\_event captures the moment when the transaction is finished.**

**Agents' message constraints are observed**

# Functional Coverage

- All possible paths between all the starting and ending states.
- Covered complete instruction set.
- Couple of weeks to finish the run.

A simple sequence to capture the current value of tad\_nxm, the register that records Agents' transitions.

```
sequence tnxm(xnm); (tad_nxm == xnm); Endsequence
```

```
cover property((tnxm(20'h00000)[*1:$]##1 tnxm(20'h100a9)[*1:$]));
```

```
cover property((tnxm(20'h00000)[*1:$]##1 tnxm(20'h100aa)[*1:$]##1 tnxm(20'h2001a)[*1:$]));
```

```
cover property((tnxm(20'h00000)[*1:$]##1 tnxm(20'h1011b)[*1:$]));
```

```
cover property((tnxm(20'h00000)[*1:$]##1 tnxm(20'h101f3)[*1:$]##1 tnxm(20'h20019)[*1:$]));
```

Auto generated sequences, while assuming default clocking and disable blocks are defined.

# Results

# Results and Conclusions

- The first and biggest challenge is the completeness of the tables.
  - There were missing transitions in home, remote, and IOB tables.
    - The missing transitions cause dead-ends (a benign form of deadlocks).
- The next biggest set of bugs originated from the bad transitions.
  - The architect inadvertently inserted wrong transition of a few operations.  
There were missing or wrong micro-operations.
- There were few unreachable transitions as well.
- The functional coverage using sequence coverage is a powerful mechanism to prove the completeness of the effort.
  - We found that there were few sequences that were not reachable because of the architectural constraints.

# References

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**Thank You.**