

Automate and Accelerate RISC-V Verification by Compositional Formal Methods

Yean-Ru Chen, Cheng-Ting Kao, Yi-Chun Kao, Tien-Yin Cheng, Chun-Sheng Ke and Chia-Hao Hsu

Department of Electrical Engineering, National Cheng Kung University,
Tainan City, Taiwan (R.O.C)



Outline


- Introduction
- Application
- Experimental results
- Conclusions

Outline

- Introduction
- Application
- Experimental results
- Conclusions

CPU Verification

- Many optimizations applied to improve performance
 - Pipelining, forwarding, out-of-order execution, etc.
- Simulation is hard to cover the whole functionality of processor
 - Hard to think of all corner cases and harder to simulate all corner cases
- Formal verification technique has become a trend



CAGR : Compound annual growth rate

Source : The 2016 Wilson Research Group ASIC/IC and FPGA Functional Verification Study

ARM ISA-Formal

- End-to-end framework to detect bugs in the datapath, pipeline control and forwarding/stall logic of processors by model checking
- Explore all the legal different sequences of instructions and able to detect the defects mentioned above

Cite : Alastair Reid et al., "End-to-end verification of processors with ISA-formal," International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, 2016.

riscv-formal

- Framework for formal end-to-end verification of RISC-V cores against the ISA specification
- Propose a RISC-V Formal Interface (RVFI) for riscv-formal

Cite : Clifford Wolf. RISC-V Formal Verification Framework. <https://github.com/cliffordwolf/riscv-formal>, 2016.


Deficiencies of Related Works

- ARM ISA formal
 - CSR instruction
 - State-space explosion problem
 - Coverage information
- riscv-formal
 - Need to pre-set checking depths
 - Environment calls/breakpoints instructions
 - Check the read/write contents of CSR but not for CSR instructions
 - Properties are manually created
 - state-space explosion problem
 - coverage information

Outline


- Introduction
- **Application**
- Experimental results
- Conclusions

Proposed Workflow



Extend RVFI for Property Auto-generation

- Automatically generate RV32I formal properties based on well-qualified machine readable specification
- Extend RVFI for more functions




Extend RVFI for Property Auto-generation (cont'd)

- Original SVA property for checking *add* instruction

```
1  logic [31:0] gold_add;
2  property ori_add;
3  @(posedge clk )disable iff(reset)
4  addtrigger
5  |=>
6  (gold_add == rvfi_rd_wdata );
7  endproperty
8  property_ori_add:assert property (ori_add);
9
10 always_ff@(posedge clk) begin
11     gold_add <= rvfi_rs1_rdata + rvfi_rs2_rdata;
12 end
```

Verification Space Abstraction by Property Splitting

- Original SVA property for the *add* instruction is able to verify two targets :
 - Checks the correctness of the data forwarding (red)
 - Checks if the actual result data is correctly written back to the destination register (blue)



Split SVA Properties for Checking *add* Instruction

2. Checks if the actual result data is correctly written back to the destination register

1. Checks the correctness of the data forwarding

```
1  logic [31:0] wb_data_pipe;
2  always_ff@(posedge clk) begin
3      wb_data <= vscale_regfile.wd;
4  end
5
6  property rd_wb_test;
7      @(posedge clk )disable iff(reset)
8      addtrigger
9      |=>
10     (wb_data == rvfi_rd_wdata );
11  endproperty
12  property_rd_wb_test:assert property (rd_wb_test);
13
14
15  logic [31:0] gold_add;
16  property fwding_add;
17      @(posedge clk )disable iff(reset)
18      addtrigger
19      |=>
20     (gold_add == wb_data );
21  endproperty
22  property_fwding_add:assert property (fwding_add);
23
24  always_ff@(posedge clk) begin
25      gold_add <= rvfi_rs1_rdata + rvfi_rs2_rdata;
26  end
```

Compositional Formal Verification Method

- Assume-guarantee reasoning

$$\frac{\mathbf{M} \parallel \mathbf{A} \models \mathbf{P} \quad \mathbf{N} \models \mathbf{A}}{\mathbf{M} \parallel \mathbf{N} \models \mathbf{P}}$$

Premise

Conclusion

- M and N : Components
- A : Assumption
- P : Property
- ||: Composite
- \models : Satisfy

M = checking datapath of writing data to correct destination register

N = checking datapath of computing the correct write back data

P = checking whether the correct data is calculated and sent to the correct destination register

A = assumption describing that the correctness of data forwarding is assumed valid


Outline

- Introduction
- Application
- **Experimental results**
- Conclusions

Design under verification


- Vscale

- 32-bit 3-stage single-issue pipeline CPU



- RV12

- 32/64-bit 6-stage single-issue pipeline CPU



- Verification environment :

- Server running CentOS 6.10., which has 48 cores with 2.20 GHz CPU and 256 GB memory embedded
 - Using Cadence JasperGold 2018.03

Comparison

- Take Vscale for example

	Original	Abstract	
Property name	<i>original_add</i>	<i>forward_add</i>	<i>rd_wb_test</i>
Result	Pass	Pass	Pass
Time (sec)	75140.4	1187.3	6.7
COI coverage of pipeline module	93.13%	93.13%	
Proof core coverage of pipeline module	48.98%	60.60%	

- **Cone-of-influence (COI) coverage** : Determines the cover items in the Cone-of-influence of each assert
- **Proof core coverage** : Represents the portion of the design verified by formal engines

Results of Vscale ISA formal verification

Instruction type	Number of properties	Execution time (second)	Verification result
R-type	22	16167.3	PASS (except <i>sra</i> instruction)
I-type	18	23482.0	PASS (except <i>srai</i> instruction)
B-type	12	1624.2	PASS
J-type	8	15.8	PASS (except <i>jlr</i> instruction)
L-type	12	38.2	PASS
S-type	8	39.3	PASS
U-type	4	29.8	PASS
Assumption	4	---	---
Total properties	88	---	---

Number of inconclusive instruction properties in RV12

Instruction type	# of properties (inconclusive/total) (without abstraction)	# of properties (inconclusive/total) (with abstraction)	Improvements (%)
R-TYPE	10/10	5/10	50.0%
I-TYPE	9/9	3/9	66.6%
J-TYPE	2/4	1/4	25.0%

Coverage information

- Vscale

- Top module :

- COI coverage : 92.80 %
 - Proof core coverage : 76.96 %

- Core module :

- COI coverage : 92.87 % waive → 98.18 %
 - Proof core coverage : 75.92 % → 89.11 %

- RV12

- Top module :

- COI coverage : 67.93 %
 - Proof core coverage : 61.17 %

- Core module :

- COI coverage : 87.85 % waive → 96.11 %
 - Proof core coverage : 83.33 % → 91.57 %

Defects found by our verification flow

- Vscale :
 - *sra* and *srai*
 - *jalr*
- RV12 :
 - *csrrwi*

Error in *sra* and *srai* instructions (Vscale)

- “Arithmetic right shifts” operator should be “>>>”, while they are implemented as “>>” which is the logical right shift operator.

◆ Vscale ALU implementation

```
4 module vscale_alu(  
5     input  [`ALU_OP_WIDTH-1:0] op,  
6     input  [`XPR_LEN-1:0] in1,  
7     input  [`XPR_LEN-1:0] in2,  
8     output reg [`XPR_LEN-1:0] out  
9 );  
10  
11 wire  [`SHAMT_WIDTH-1:0] shamt;  
12  
13 assign shamt = in2[`SHAMT_WIDTH-1:0];  
14  
15 always @* begin  
16     case (op)  
17         `ALU_OP_ADD : out = in1 + in2;  
18         `ALU_OP_SLL : out = in1 << shamt;  
19         `ALU_OP_XOR : out = in1 ^ in2;  
20         `ALU_OP_OR  : out = in1 | in2;  
21         `ALU_OP_AND : out = in1 & in2;  
22         `ALU_OP_SRL : out = in1 >> shamt;  
23         `ALU_OP_SEQ : out = {31'b0, in1 == in2};  
24         `ALU_OP_SNE : out = {31'b0, in1 != in2};  
25         `ALU_OP_SUB : out = in1 - in2;  
26         `ALU_OP_SRA : out = $signed(in1) >> shamt;  
27         `ALU_OP_SLT : out = {31'b0, $signed(in1) < $signed(in2)};  
28         `ALU_OP_SGE : out = {31'b0, $signed(in1) >= $signed(in2)};  
29         `ALU_OP_SLTU : out = {31'b0, in1 < in2};  
30         `ALU_OP_SGEU : out = {31'b0, in1 >= in2};  
31         default : out = 0;  
32     endcase // case op  
33 end
```

Error in *jalr* instruction (Vscale)

- Vscale directly sets the lowest bit of the immediate value to be 0 and then adding to rs1, which is different from RISC-V specification requirements

◆ Part of Vscale PC mux implementation

```
17 wire [`XPR_LEN-1:0]
```

```
22 always @(*) begin
23     case (PC_src_sel)
24         `PC_JAL_TARGET : begin
25             base = PC_DX;
26             offset = jal_offset;
27         end
28         `PC_JALR_TARGET : begin
29             base = rs1_data;
30             offset = jalr_offset;
31         end
32     end
33 end
```

```
64 assign PC_PIF = base + offset;
```

```
jalr_offset = { {21{inst_DX[31]}}, inst_DX[30:21], 1'b0 };
```

Error in “*csrrwi*” instructions (RV12)

- *csrrs*, *csrrc*, *csrrsi* and *csrrci*

- Have to concern whether source register is *x0*

rs = x0
→

Shall not cause illegal instruction exception

- *csrrw* and *csrrwi*

- Shouldn't concern whether source register is *x0*

rs = x0
→

Still cause illegal instruction exception

◆ Part of RV12 decode stage implementation

```
724 //system
725 {1'b?, CSRRW } : illegal_alu_instr = illegal_csr_rd | illegal_csr_wr ;
726 {1'b?, CSRRS } : illegal_alu_instr = illegal_csr_rd | (|if_src1 & illegal_csr_wr) ;
727 {1'b?, CSRRC } : illegal_alu_instr = illegal_csr_rd | (|if_src1 & illegal_csr_wr) ;
728 {1'b?, CSRRWI} : illegal_alu_instr = illegal_csr_rd | (|if_src1 & illegal_csr_wr) ;
729 {1'b?, CSRRSI} : illegal_alu_instr = illegal_csr_rd | (|if_src1 & illegal_csr_wr) ;
730 {1'b?, CSRRCI} : illegal_alu_instr = illegal_csr_rd | (|if_src1 & illegal_csr_wr) ;
731
732 default: illegal_alu_instr = 1'b1;
```


Outline

- Introduction
- Application
- Experimental results
- **Conclusions**

Conclusions

- Propose a verification flow to automatically generate the formal properties for RISC-V RV32I instructions
- The properties are reliable by coverage analysis information
 - Proof coverage can average about 90% in core module after waive unconcerned module
- Using abstraction technique to mitigate state-space explosion problem
- Defect the faults in our experimental CPU
 - *sra*, *srai* and *jalr* instructions in Vscale case
 - *csrrwi* instruction in RV12 case

Thank you for your attention!

Q&A

Author Contact Information: chenyr@mail.ncku.edu.tw