

Applying High-Level Synthesis for Synthesizing Hardware Runtime STL Monitors of Mission-Critical Properties

Konstantin Selyunin¹, Thang Nguyen² Andrei-Daniel Basa², Ezio Bartocci¹ Dejan Nickovic³, Radu Grosu¹

¹Vienna University of Technology, Vienna, Austria ²Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Villach, Austria ³AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, Austria





Challenges/Motivations

Data/Information Evaluation:

- Pos-SIM/Pos-MEAS
- Root-cause Analysis
- System Properties Monitoring





Challenges/Motivations

Data/Information Evaluation:

- Pos-SIM/Pos-MEAS
- Root-cause Analysis
- System Properties Monitoring

Specification Formalization using Temporal Logic:

- Formal rigorous semantics
- No ambiguities about the intended meaning of requirements
- Minimizes information losses due to different interpretation







Runtime Verification



Main features [Leu12]:

UNITED STATES

- Check correctness properties based on the actual execution of a software or hardware system
- Make sure that the implementation really meets its correctness properties (apart from the model)
- Use information available at runtime
- Monitor behavior or properties that have been statically proved or tested: employ RV as a redundancy mechanism in safety-critical systems



Runtime Verification



Main features [Leu12]:

- Check correctness properties based on the actual execution of a software or hardware system
- Make sure that the implementation really meets its correctness properties (apart from the model)
- Use information available at runtime
- Monitor behavior or properties that have been statically proved or tested: employ RV as a redundancy mechanism in safety-critical systems

2016 DESIGN AND VERIELCATION" DVCDUD CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION UNITED STATES

Runtime Verification



Main features [Leu12]:

- Check correctness properties based on the actual execution of a software or hardware system
- Make sure that the implementation really meets its correctness properties (apart from the model)
- Use information available at runtime
- Monitor behavior or properties that have been statically proved or tested: employ RV as a redundancy mechanism in safety-critical systems

2016 DESIGN AND VERIFICATION" DVCCON CONFERENCE AND EXHIBITION UNITED STATES

Runtime Verification



Main features [Leu12]:

- Check correctness properties based on the actual execution of a software or hardware system
- Make sure that the implementation really meets its correctness properties (apart from the model)
- Use information available at runtime
- Monitor behavior or properties that have been statically proved or tested: employ RV as a redundancy mechanism in safety-critical systems



You already know Temporal Logic (TL)

- when you say
 - "It is always the case that the violation must not occur"
 - "Eventually the system must recover"
 - "The presentation until the coffee break"



You already know Temporal Logic (TL)

- when you say
 - "It is always the case that the violation must not occur"
 - "Eventually the system must recover"
 - "The presentation until the coffee break"

We already used Temporal Logic without knowing it!

TL is a *structured* way to reason about events on a time axis



You already know Temporal Logic (TL)

- when you say
 - "It is always the case that the violation must not occur"
 - "Eventually the system must recover"
 - "The presentation until the coffee break"

We already used Temporal Logic without knowing it!

TL is a *structured* way to reason about events on a time axis

Advantages of using Temporal Logic:

- removing ambiguity
- operating with mathematical objects
- allowing automation



Temporal logics: from LTL to STL¹

- Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
 - (A.Pnueli 1977)
 - logical time, unbounded

¹thanks to A.Rodionova



Temporal logics: from LTL to STL¹

- Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
 - (A.Pnueli 1977)
 - logical time, unbounded
- Metric Temporal Logic (MTL)
 - (R.Koymans 1990, T.Henzinger 1993)
 - continuous/discrete time, bounded, with punctual intervals



Temporal logics: from LTL to STL¹

- Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
 - (A.Pnueli 1977)
 - logical time, unbounded
- Metric Temporal Logic (MTL)
 - (R.Koymans 1990, T.Henzinger 1993)
 - $\operatorname{continuous}/\operatorname{discrete}$ time, bounded, with punctual intervals
- Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL)
 - (R.Alur, T.Feder, T.Henzinger 1996)
 - $continuous/discrete\ time,\ bounded,\ without\ punctual\ intervals$



Temporal logics: from LTL to STL¹

- Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
 - (A.Pnueli 1977)

logical time, unbounded

Metric Temporal Logic (MTL)

(R.Koymans 1990, T.Henzinger 1993)

continuous/discrete time, bounded, with punctual intervals

Metric Interval Temporal Logic (MITL)

(R.Alur, T.Feder, T.Henzinger 1996)

continuous/discrete time, bounded, without punctual intervals

Signal Temporal Logic (STL)

(O.Maler, D.Nickovic 2004)

continuous/discrete time, bounded, comparison with reals

¹thanks to A.Rodionova









Temporal operators

• eventually $[t_1, t_2] \varphi = true until_{[t_1, t_2]} \varphi$



Temporal operators

- eventually $[t_1, t_2] \varphi = \text{true until}_{[t_1, t_2]} \varphi$
- **always** $[t_1, t_2] \varphi = \text{not eventually}[t_1, t_2] \text{ not } \varphi$



Temporal operators

- eventually_[t1,t2] $\varphi = \text{true until}_{[t_1,t_2]} \varphi$
- **always**_[t_1, t_2] $\varphi = \text{not eventually}_{[t_1, t_2]} \text{ not } \varphi$
- $\blacksquare \ \texttt{next} \ \varphi = \texttt{eventually}_{\{1\}} \ \varphi = \texttt{always}_{\{1\}} \ \varphi$

STL: Past and Future

Evaluation of an STL formula on a time axis



Past

INITED STATES

- Looking backward from t_{start}
- Always bounded (there is t = 0)

Future

- Looking forward from *t*_{start}
- Can be unbounded (future might be infinite)



The signal w satisfies an STL formula next φ at a time step *i* iff at a time step i + 1 w satisfies φ .



The signal w satisfies an STL formula $next \varphi$ at a time step *i* iff at a time step i + 1 w satisfies φ .



 $(w,i) \models \texttt{eventually}_{[a,b]} \varphi \qquad \leftrightarrow \exists j \in i + [a,b] \cap \mathbb{T} : (w,j) \models \varphi_2$

The signal w satisfies eventually $_{[a,b]}\varphi$ at a time step *i* if there exist a time point *j* in the interval [a, b] where w satisfies φ .



The signal w satisfies an STL formula $always_{[a,b]}\varphi$ at a time step *i* if for all time points *j* in the interval [a, b] w satisfies φ .



The signal w satisfies an STL formula $always_{[a,b]}\varphi$ at a time step *i* if for all time points *j* in the interval [a, b] w satisfies φ .



The signal w satisfies an STL formula $\varphi_1 \text{until}_{[a,b]}\varphi_2$ at a time step *i* if there exists a time point *j* in the interval [a, b] where φ_2 holds and for all previous time steps φ_1 holds.



















Monitor Generation Flow





Requirements





2016 Pastification & Simplification





Offline Monitoring





STL Primitives





High Level Synthesis





STL: from Future to Past

Future temporal operators reason about events in the future

- every bounded future formula can be converted to past (so-called pastification)
- the verdict of a specification satisfaction is shifted in time



High Level Synthesis

HDL Generation

- compare HW & SW implementations (HW specific data types)
- apply optimization directives (optimize for throughput or area: e.g. array partition, pipelining)
- synthesize the HDL
- co-simulate the synthesized code
- export IP



Case Study: Specification

"When the missile received the launch enable signal, it must see the fire enable signal followed within the next four time points. After fire en has arrived, no detonation is allowed for the next five time points."

STL formalization: Future formula

■ Detonation must not happen within 5 time units after rise of fire_en ↑ launch_en → $\bigcirc_{[0;4]}$ (↑ fire_en $\land \square_{[0;5]} \neg$ detonation)



Case Study: Specification



"When the missile received the launch enable signal, it must see the fire enable signal followed within the next four time points. After fire en has arrived, no detonation is allowed for the next five time points."

STL formalization: Future formula

■ Detonation must not happen within 5 time units after rise of fire_en ↑ launch_en → $\diamondsuit_{[0;4]}$ (↑ fire_en $\land \square_{[0;5]} \neg$ detonation)



Monitor Generation

Pastified property:

Pastified specification

$$\diamondsuit_{\{9\}} \uparrow \ell \to \diamondsuit_{[0,4]} \left(\diamondsuit_{\{5\}} \uparrow f \land \Box_{[0;5]} \neg d \right)$$







The takeaway message:

- From system level requirements to hardware monitors
- Signal Temporal Logic as a specification language
- High Level Synthesis for HDL generation





References I



Martin Leucker.

Teaching Runtime Verification.

In Sarfraz Khurshid and Koushik Sen, editors, *Runtime Verification*, volume 7186 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 34–48. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.