

An Automated Formal Verification Flow for Safety Registers

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Motivation

- Automotive safety applications
 - ADAS/Autonomous driving, breaking systems,...
- Microcontrollers need
 - Hardware and software safety mechanisms
 - Redundancy
 - Robustness
 - ISO 26262 compliant development processes
 - Modular hierarchical design
 - Evidence for effectiveness of installed safety mechanisms

Register Specification


| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|----|----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|------|-----|------------------|---|------------------------------------|--|
| SFRX000 | | | | | | | | | | 200 _H | | Reset Value:22C0 0000 _H | |
| 31 | 30 | 29 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 23 | 22 | 1 | 0 | | |
| LCK | 0 | EN | ERR | DIV | | BTE | BYP | STAT | CLR | MODE | | | |
| rwh | r | rw | rwh | rw | | rwh | rw | rh | w | rw | | | |

- Short register name
- Offset address
- Reset value
- Reset class
- Access modes
- Bit-fields
 - Short name
 - Access type
 - Index range

```

<SFR>
  <SFRNAME>SFRX00</SFRNAME>
  <OADDR>200</OADDR>
  <RVAL>22C00000< <RCLASS>PORST<RCLASS>
  <WACC>SV</WACC> <RACC>U,SV</RACC>
  <BF>
    <BFNAME>DIV</BFNAME>
    <BFTYPE>rw</BFTYPE>
    <BFIH>27</BFIH> <BFIL<26</BFIL>
  </BF>
    
```

White-Box Specification




- RTL signal name
- Bit-fields
 - SW write protection
 - HW write condition
 - HW write value
 - Default value
 - Write latenc

```

<SFR>
  <SFRNAME>SFRX000</SFRNAME>
  <RTLNAME>inst0/inst02/inst021/sfrx00</RTLNAME>
  <BF>
    <BFNAME>BTE</BFNAME>
    <PR>SFRX00.LCK = 1</PR>
    <HCOND>MODE = TEST</HCOND>
    <HVAL>1</HVAL>
    <DVAL>BF</DVAL>
    <LAT>1</LAT>>
  </BF>
    
```



Safety Requirements



```



<SFR>
  <SFRNAME>SFRX00</SFRNAME>
  <BF> <BFNAME>LCK</BFNAME> <SFTY>CORR</PR> </BF>
  <BF> <BFNAME>ERR</BFNAME> <SFTY>DET</PR> </BF>
  <BF> <BFNAME>STAT</BFNAME> <SFTY>None</PR> </BF>
  
```

Register Safeguarding





- FF : simple Flip-Flop
- SFF : 2 FF-cells ~> alarm
- SFF2: 3 FF-cells + majority decision ~> correction + alarm

Detection Only




- Inputs: data, write enable
- Outputs: uncorrected data, alarm

Correction



- Inputs: data, write enable
- Outputs: corrected data, alarm

Plugging Together



Formal Register Properties

- Black-Box:
 - Write + read from Bus:
Previous write data
identically read,
if no intermediate write and
if no reset

```
j := BFih(SFRX00,ERR);  
trd := twr + 3;  
val := BUS_WR_DATA(j)@twr+1;  
during[twr,trd+1]:  
    RST(RSTCL(SFRX00)) = 0;  
at twr:  
    BUS_WR_BF(SFRX00,ERR);  
during[twr+1,trd]:  
    not BUS_WR_BF(SFRX00,ERR);  
at trd:  
    BUS_RD_BF(SFRX00,ERR);  
|- at trd+1: BUS_RD_DATA(j) = val;
```

- White-Box:
 - HW Write:
HW-write condition true,
HW-write data depending on internal signals

```

val := BF_HVAL(SFRX00,BFK)@twr+1;
during[twr,twr+2]:
RST(RSTCL(SFRX00)) = 0;
at twr+1:
  BF_HCOND(SFRX00,ERR);
at twr:
  not BUS_WR_BF(SFRX00,ERR) V
  BF_PR(SFRX00,ERR) = 1
|- at twr+2: BF(SFRX00,BFK) = val;

```

```

BF_HCOND(SFRX00,ERR) := <Overflow>;
BF_PR(SFRX00,ERR) := inst0/inst02/inst021/sfrx00(31) = 1;
BF(SFRX00,ERR) = inst0/inst02/inst021/sfrx00(28);

```

Aggregate Register Properties

- List of registers:
 - All rwh-bit-fields checked at once

```
isfr:= any(SFR_indices); ibf:=1..number_BFs(i);
trd := twr + 1; val := BF_HVAL(i,j)@twr+1;
BF_TYPE(isfr,ibf) = rwh  $\wedge$  BF_LAT(isfr,ibf) = 1;
during[twr,trd+1]:
    RST(RSTCL(isfr)) = 0;
at twr:
    not BUS_WR_BF(isfr,ibf)  $\vee$ 
    BF_PR(isfr,ibf) = 1  $\vee$ 
    BF_SPRIO(isfr,ibf) = 0;
at twr+1:
    BF_HCOND(isfr,ibf);
|- at trd+1: BF(isfr,ibf) = val;
```


Register Safety Properties

- List of registers:
 - Any error in any bit-field of any register causes alarm

```
isfr:= any(SFR_indices); ibf:=1..number_BFs(i);  
during[te,te+1]:  
    RST(RSTCL(isfr)) = 0;  
at te: be(isfr,ibf);  
|- at te+1: alarm = 1;
```

Fault Models

- Cut signals into fan-in (output) and fan-out part
- Assume fault in property assumption




Vectorization for Negation Model


- Concatenate all corresponding bits
- Construct difference vectors
- Count 1-positions in difference vectors for duplicated FlipFlops

```
sff_q0_o := inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sffj0/q0_o & ... inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sffj5/q0_o ... ;
sff_q0_i := inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sffj0/q0_i & ...inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sffj5/q0_i ... ;
sff_q1_o := inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sffj0/q1_o & ...inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sffj5/q1_o ... ;
sff_q1_i := inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sffj00/q1_i & ...inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sffj5/q1_i ... ;
be(SFRx000,ibf) := ((sff_q0_o xor sff_q0_i)(ibf) xor (sff_q1_o xor sff_q1_i)(ibf) = 1;
```

sbe: detected



dbe: undetected




- Concatenate all corresponding bits of triplicated Flip-Flops

```
sff2_q0_o :=      inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sff2i0/q0_o & ...  
                  inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sff2i5/q0_o ... ;  
  
sff2_q1_o :=      inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sff2i0/q1_o & ...  
                  inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sff2i5/q1_o ... ;  
  
sff2_q2_o :=      inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sff2i0/q2_o & ...  
                  inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sff2i5/q2_o ... ;  
  
sff2_q0_i :=      inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sff2i0/q0_i & ...  
                  inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sff2i5/q0_i ... ;  
  
sff2_q1_i :=      inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sff2i0/q1_i & ...  
                  inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sff2i5/q1_i ... ;  
  
sff2_q2_i :=      inst0/inst00/inst000/inst_sff2i0/q2_i & ...  
                  inst0/inst02/inst021/inst_sff2i5/q2_i ... ;
```


- Form vectors for single, double, triple bit errors

```


sbe_sff2 := ((sff2_q0_o xor sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o = sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o = sff2_q2_i )) or
            ((sff2_q0_o = sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o xor sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o = sff2_q2_i )) or
            ((sff2_q0_o = sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o = sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o xor sff2_q2_i ));
dbe_sff2 := ((sff2_q0_o xor sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o xor sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o = sff2_q2_i )) or
            ((sff2_q0_o xor sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o = sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o xor sff2_q2_i )) or
            ((sff2_q0_o = sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o xor sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o xor sff2_q2_i ));
tbe_sff2 := ((sff2_q0_o xor sff2_q0_i ) and (sff2_q1_o xor sff2_q1_i ) and (sff2_q2_o xor sff2_q2_i ));
    
```



sbe: corrected



dbe: detected



tbe: undetected

Aggregate Safety Properties

| | |
|---|---|
| $sbe(n) := \text{count1s}(sbe_sff) = n;$ | $sbe2(n) := \text{count1s}(sbe_sff2) = n;$ |
| $dbe(n) := \text{count1s}(dbe_sff) = n;$ | $dbe2(n) := \text{count1s}(dbe_sff2) = n;$ |

- Regular SFR property on fault-injected model

| | | |
|--|---|------|
| $\langle \text{sfr_prop} \rangle := \langle \text{sfr_prop_assumption} \rangle$ | $\vdash \langle \text{sfr_prop_commitment} \rangle$ | fail |
|--|---|------|


| | | |
|--|---|------|
| $sbe(0) \wedge dbe(0) \wedge dbe2(0) \wedge$ $\langle \text{sfr_prop_assumption} \rangle$ | $\vdash \langle \text{sfr_prop_commitment} \rangle$ | hold |
|--|---|------|

| | | |
|--|--|------|
| $sbe(n0) \wedge sbe2(n2) \wedge dbe2(n3) \wedge n0 + n1 + n2 + n3 > 0$ | $\vdash \text{sfr_red_alarm_o} = 1$ | hold |
|--|--|------|

| | | |
|--|--|------|
| $\langle \text{sfr_prop} \rangle := sbe(n0) \wedge sbe2(n2) \wedge dbe2(n3) \wedge n0 + n1 + n2 + n3 = 0$ | $\vdash \text{sfr_red_alarm_o} = 0$ | hold |
|--|--|------|

| | | |
|--|---|------|
| $\text{sfr_red_alarm_o} = 0 \wedge$ $\langle \text{sfr_prop_assumption} \rangle$ | $\vdash \langle \text{sfr_prop_commitment} \rangle$ | hold |
|--|---|------|

Automated Register Verification Flow



White-Box versus Black-Box Props

| Operation | Black-Box | White-Box |
|-------------------------|--|---|
| Read pure rw-bit-fields | Write, then read; compare bus read data with previous write data | Just read; compare bus read data with internal contents |
| Read rwh-bit-fields | n/a: Internal hw-write after sw-write can modify register | ---“--- |
| Read rh-bit-fields | n/a: no value to compare with read value | ---“--- |
| Write rw-bit-fields | Like read property | compare bus write data with internal contents |
| Write rwh-bit-fields | n/a | ---“--- |
| Write rh-bit-fields | n/a: no value to compare with read value | ---“--- |
| HW-write | n/a: neither write value, nor internal contents accessible | compare hw write data with internal contents |

Experience and Results

- Black-box properties
 - Cover pure rw-registers
 - Required macros are generated fully automatically
- White-box properties
 - Cover all function of all registers including hw writes
 - Additional macros to be partially edited, partially inheritance + default guesses
- Aggregate SFR-properties
 - Cover all bit-fields of all registers simultaneously
130 SFRs completely verified by 30 black- and white-box properties in 35 minutes with up to 10 parallel proofs
- Safety properties generated fully automatically
 - All potential faults checked simultaneously by 20 properties with exhaustive fault-injection, built-in self-test logic covered as well very efficient: e.g. 3000 faults in 25 minutes
 - Macro generation in less than one minute

Conclusions

- Formal register verification is most efficient and complete -> highest quality
- Formal safety verification completely checks hw safety-mechanism -> evidence for ISO26262 certification
- Maximum efficiency by
 - Automatic transformation of XML specifications
 - Uniform safety mechanisms
 - Corresponding pre-defined generic properties
 - Automatically generated + inherited design-specific macros

Questions

Finalize slide set with questions slide