

# Comprehensive Glitch and Connectivity Sign-Off


Vikas Sachdeva, Oren Katzir, Vardan Vardanyan






### Glitches

- Glitches occur on both synchronous and asynchronous paths in digital design
- On synchronous paths STA ensures that glitches are resolved and don't cause design failures
  - Unless path is an exception in STA (False path, MCP, etc.)
- Asynchronous paths are not timed in STA and can cause problems if glitches are the










## Glitches on CDC Path








#### Glitches on CDC Path

- Pre-Silicon SDF simulations pointed to a failure in synchronization FIFO logic
- Additional reviews showed that the RTL passed all CDC qualifications
  - RTL contains CDC (glitch) blocking logic. High level schematic below
- This led to the conclusion that the GL resulting from synthesis was faulty
  - Asynchronous glitches from sender clock domain were sampled in receiver clock domain







#### Glitches on CDC Path

• Synthesis implements a formally equivalent but glitchy implementation on CDC path

RTL	Expected Implementation	After Synthesis
always @(*) begin case( ra ) 8'd0: dout = ram_ff0; 8'd1: dout = ram_ff1;  8'dN: dout = ram_ffN; default: dout = {8{`x_or_0}}; endcase end	ram_ff0	ras Mux


This can happen when case statement is not complete





#### RTL and Netlist Glitch Verification – Meridian CDC

- CDC Glitch Verification methodology
  - Uses structural, local formal and formal means to ensure no glitches in the design
  - At RTL users can specify set\_dont\_touch cells







### Motivation: Glitch-Checking at RTL?

- Why Glitch-checking at RTL?
  - Most companies do the CDC sign-off at RTL
  - Would like to avoid CDC sign-off at netlist if possible
  - Glitches are the biggest risk of RTL-based CDC sign-off flows
- Aren't glitches typically introduced during synthesis?
  - Solution: Develop a strict methodology verifiable at RTL
  - All TX-RX paths should be unate
  - If multiple TX-es converge, they must converge in a multiplexor (single-path sensitization)
  - The multiplexor must be a glitch-free multiplexor that synthesis cannot modify





#### Glitch Checks at RTL

- SINGLE\_TX\_GLITCH\_STRUCT: Every driver-receiver path is analyzed for glitch due to reconvergence of the driver with opposite polarity
- MULTIPLE\_TX\_NO\_USER\_MUX: For all receivers with multiple-drivers, the rule checks if any two drivers converge outside an user-specified multiplexer (MUX)
- GLITCH\_FREE:
  - For crossings with single-drivers, all the paths from the driver to receiver must be glitchfree
  - For crossings with multiple-drivers, all the paths from each driver to receiver must be glitch-free. Moreover, if 2 drivers converge, the convergence-point has to be within an user-defined-mux





### Glitch Checking at Netlist

- Why do Glitch-checking at Netlist?
  - Some companies are unable to execute strict methodology at RTL
  - Presence of external-IP that has not undergone the strict methodology checks





### SINGLE\_TX\_GLITCH

- This check reports every driver-receiver pair that has a potential glitch on its path
- A path is glitchy if the driver re-convergences with opposite polarities in the path









### Glitch Errors on non-CDC paths

- Glitch = transition shorter than signal's clock period
- Errors: Untimed path glitches associated with user-specified, multicycle, & false paths
- Glitch can occur close to clock edge of receiving flop.
- Not caught by STA/Tcl scripts or simulation




Glitch on a protected path can cause the chip to fail







## Glitch on Multicycle path








## Check Glitches – Single Driver / Multi-Driver


Check if a single driver can cause a glitch at the receiver

set\_no\_glitch -rule R5 -from F1.q -formal -output glitch.rpt



Check if multiple drivers can cause a glitch at the receiver

set\_no\_glitch -rule R4 -to F2.q -formal -output glitch.rpt








### Glitch sign-off – IP level, Chip level

- On untimed paths, Glitch can be fatal
- Numerous companies had late-stage netlist-glitch failures
  - IP vendor provided glitchy-IP (@outputs) to customer
  - Automotive chip had glitch-potential, designers were unaware
  - Memory-controller chip went through multiple ECOs because of glitch failures





Glitch Detected on path to Analog IP





## Glitch Sign-off Flow









- Compatibility and Integration
  - Ensuring that IP cores are compatible with various target SoCs
  - Seamlessly integrated into different designs.
  - SoCs often incorporate multiple IP blocks (e.g., CPU, GPU, memory controllers) from different sources.
  - Requires meticulous integration and verification efforts





- Interconnect Design
  - Efficient communication between the components of an SoC is crucial for optimal performance.
  - Designing high-speed interconnects that deliver the required bandwidth while minimizing latency and power consumption





- Security
  - SoCs, especially those in connected devices, must be fortified against a range of security threats.
  - Incorporating robust security features like
    - secure boot
    - encryption
    - hardware root of trust,
  - Maintaining minimal performance overhead





- Scalability and Reusability
  - To reduce time-to-market and development costs,
  - Reuse of IP blocks and scalability.
  - Requires careful planning and a modular design approach.







# STATIC SIGN-OFF METHDOLOGY





#### Static Verification vs Dynamic Verification

#### Dynamic verification

- Dynamically computes design behavior to find failures
- Coverage limited to test cases

#### Static verification

- Utilizes search & analysis to find ALL targeted failures
- Test cases not required

Simulation Emulation

CDC

Lint...

**Formal** 


STA

**DRC** 





## Static Sign-off vs Formal & Simulation








## Functional Static Sign-Off Expanding Applications

Functional static sign-off began with RTL Linting & CDC

The target applications continuously expand








#### Clock Domain Crossing Verification — Completing signoff by linking static & dynamic verification

Meridian CDC

Case Study By Krithivas Krishnaswami of NVIDIA



#### **Case Study Overview**

Krithivas Krishnaswami discusses NVIDIA's successful evaluation of a methodology for completing clock domain crossing verification by linkings CDC static sign-off and simulation. Real Intent's Meridian CDC and the Meridian CDC Simportal feature were deployed.

Edited transcript and graphics.





#### Cloud-Based Static Sign-Off Methodology for TPU Machine Learning Hardware

Presented by Hamid Shojaei

#### Google



Cloud TPU: Empowering EDA with Google Cloud AI

DAC 2021 presentation by Hamid Shojaei of Google (edited transcript)

#### Case Study Overview

Hamid Shojaei of Google presents a case study on Google's cloud-based static sign-off methodology that includes pre-submit with RTL Linting, Single mode & Multimode clock domain crossing & Reset domain crossing. (Real Intent tools deployed)






#### Dynamic CDC Verification for Memory Design

Meridian CDC

Case Study by Inryoul Lee, Principal Engineer of Samsung



#### Case Study Overview

Inryoul Lee discusses how Samsung implemented their advanced dynamic clock domain crossing verification methodology for memory design using Real Intent Meridian CDC Simportal, closing the sign-off gap between CDC static sign-off and simulation. Slightly edited transcript below.





#### Clock Domain Crossing: Constraints-Based Sign-Off Methodology

By Sharan Mohan, Pinkesh Shah, & Rambabu Singampalli Western Digital



#### I. Case Study Executive Overview

This case study covers Western Digital's enhanced constraint-driven clock domain crossing (CDC) sign-off methodology with Real Intent Meridian CDC, as presented at the 2021 Design Automation Conference.

Western Digital's enhanced methodology achieved a two-thirds to a three-quarters reduction in total CDC sign-off time, achieving sign-off in only two weeks, compared with a typical six to eight weeks.

#### II. Problem Statement & Goal

ASIC respins are expensive in terms of cost and delivery impact — good specifications, randomized simulations, and thorough verification are critical.

Functional and clocking issues rank highest among bug escapes sources; clock domain crossing issues are typically a mix of clocking and functional bugs. System on chips (SoCs) have multiple asynchronous clock domains with complex interactions; additionally, they contain several IPs from third parties, each with different configurations.

Given this complexity level, a waiver-based methodology to clean up CDC violations can be risky and lead to silicon failures.

**Goal:** Western Digital's goal was to implement an accurate, correct-by-construction clock domain crossing sign-off methodology for its SoCs while reducing its engineering effort.










# Compatibility and integration



#### Inside a modern SoC


- Ensure IP Cores are compatible with various target SoCs
- Complete verification of connections at SoC level
  - Fundamental requirement to ensure correct operation
- Requires meticulous integration and verification effort








- Source to Destination connection
  - Connected through multiple blocks
  - Across different hierarchies








- Source to Destination connection
  - Based upon conditions











- Source to Destination connection
  - Only buffers/inverters allowed
  - Any logic allowed
  - Polarity important along the path








- Source to Destination connection
  - Can be sequential
  - Precise number of cycles
  - Or Range



Grant should follow 2 cycles after request is asserted





After the rise of request signal, the acknowledge signal should be asserted no later than 3 clocks cycles.







- Reset, Clock and Global signals
  - Connected to all the flops in the design
  - Millions of paths
  - Polarity is important
  - Can propagate through specialized cells
    - Reset synchronizers
    - Clock dividers, glitch free sequential muxes







- System Registers, Configuration registers
  - Specific connectivity register based
  - Can propagate through sequential
  - Not just connection, value propagation also important








12'b0


- Interrupts
  - Specific connectivity register based
  - Can propagate through special cells like synchronizers
  - Polarity of connection important
  - No additional drivers or receivers
  - Specific conditions causing 0 value at destination (interrupt override)









- Power Logic
  - Reset connection from same power domain
  - Isolation cells and signals connectivity
  - Value checks
    - Specific values just before and after isolation








- Data, Control buses
  - Connectivity under certain conditions
  - Bus swizzle not present (incorrect bits connected)
  - Different sizes, correct hex value transferred





#### When

• Source - 0~4 : Destination - 00


Source - 5~8 : Destination - 01

Source - 9~15: Destination - 10






- Physical Design Requirements -ABUTMENT
  - Connections allowed only between specific instances
  - 1-1 Connections
  - OPEN/TIE/SPLIT is an issue








- Negative testing
  - S does not connect to D
  - S does not connect to D under specific conditions
  - S to D only through sequential
  - S to D only through buffers







- One to Many, Many to One, One to One
  - S connects to any one of the D
  - S to D only one connection
  - All S connect to the D
  - All S to All D







#### Existing Methodologies Limitations


- Simulation/Emulation
  - 100% coverage not possible
  - Need to write testbenches
  - Runtime failure may be deep rooted
  - Negative testing not possible directly
- Formal
  - Capacity would be limited
  - May need additional constraints to check properly
  - SoC runs may not be possible
  - Expert users needed
  - Some of the checks may not be formulated
    - Checks not amenable to SVAs
  - Negative testing not possible directly





#### Connectivity Checking Static Sign-Off

- Safeconnect enables connectivity checking static sign-off
- Solves compatibility and integration challenges engineers face
  Connectivity








### Connectivity Checking Static Sign-Off

Handles limitations of existing methodologies





- ✓ Easy to setup
- ✓ 100% Coverage
- **✓** Fast runtimes
- √ SoC Capacity
- ✓ Expert user not needed
- ✓ Negative testing can be done








# INTERCONNECT NOC





#### Interconnect Verification Challenges


- Power and performance
- Functional safety
- Security
- Deadlock and livelocks
- Interconnect routes or reachability





#### Interconnect Verification

- Reachability Verification
  - A particular master connected to slave
  - Protocol ports connected correctly
  - Connections through complex sequential logic (bridges etc.)
  - Negative verification masters not connected to slaves as per specification








#### Interconnect Verification

- Configuration from master reaches appropriate slave
- Transaction from master transits into the interconnect and received by corresponding slave
- If error response error code properly propagated through the interconnect back to master








#### Interconnect Verification

- Security management
  - Forbid transactions targeting secured area
- Power Management
  - When power off forbid direct access to slave








#### Interconnect Static Sign-Off

Sentry enables interconnect transaction and security signoff










## Security





#### CPU Security – Meltdown & Spectre

- Modern CPUs employ branch prediction and out-of-order execution to improve performance
- CPUs look forward and execute instructions (transient instructions)
- But are squashed before they impact architectural state
- Can be exploited to encode unauthorized data in the microarchitectural state








### CPU Security – Meltdown & Spectre

• Exposure of sensitive information during transient execution








## SoC/ Memory Subsystem Security

- Host0 and Host1 share the memory
- 4 Pages in shared memory
- MMU's configure page is read or write to/from a host
  - Page0 is shared RW and accessible by both
  - Page1 is exclusive RW to Host0
  - Page2 is exclusive RW to Host1
  - Page3 is mailbox RW by Host0 and read only by Host1
  - Configuration is written into the shared memory configuration block via a sequence of writes from an external entity








#### Data Integrity

- Secure data transfer between protected domains
  - No corruption
  - Unauthorized access
- Test for potential blocks to the paths and whether the path is vulnerable to unauthorized data transfers.
- Verify
  - Ensure that the registers' read & write permissions are correctly set by checking that only specific processes can access certain registers, and under defined conditions.
  - Verify that only the CPU can write to configuration registers and that peripheral devices have restricted read-only access
  - Check whether access to any register is blocked





#### Illegal Path Access

- No illegal or unauthorized access
- Verify the integrity of bus separation or firewall mechanisms used to prevent third party IPs from accessing secured registers








#### Leakage Prevention

- Sensitive data cannot reach unauthorized domains where it could be compromised.
- All data paths handling sensitive information are secure and isolated from non-secure data paths.








#### Interference Safeguarding

#### Verify

- Access control logic correctly grants access to authorized assets and blocks unauthorized ones.
- Suspicious or unauthorized data transfer activities that cross domain boundaries are detected
- Suspicious or unauthorized data transfer activities that cross domain boundaries are detected








## Security Static Sign-Off

Sentry enables security signoff





## Questions?





